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Fair Share: Reinvigorating the Twin 




The Metropolitan Council of the Twin Cities (Council), an 
administrative body of seventeen appointed officials, presides over 
the metropolitan area comprising Minneapolis-St. Paul.1  
Empowered with the ability to “review all proposed matters of 
metropolitan significance,” the Council maintains broad statutory 
authority to shape regional development, particularly in the realm 
of land-use planning.2  From 1970 to 1986, the Council affirmatively 
wielded this review power from above, subjecting comprehensive 
local planning to high scrutiny and often withholding state and 
federal grants until local government proposals included a fair 
share of affordable housing.3  The first iteration of the Council used 
its review power to “help implement the goal of a better distribution 
of housing types and costs throughout the area,”4 and its policy plan 
for the region placed the Twin Cities at the forefront of 
socioeconomic and racial integration.5 
 
 †. J.D. Candidate, University of Minnesota Law School, 2018; B.A., Tulane  
University, 2014.  The author expresses his appreciation to Professor Myron Orfield  
for his invaluable mentorship and expertise, without which this Article would not 
have been possible.  The author would also like to thank the staff and editors of the 
Journal of Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice for their assistance 
in preparing this Article for publication. 
 1. Who We Are, METRO. COUNCIL, https://metrocouncil.org/About-Us/The-
Council-Who-We-Are.aspx (last accessed Feb. 18, 2018). 
 2. MINN. STAT. § 473.173 (2017). 
 3. See William C. Johnson, Growth Management in the Twin Cities Region: The 
Politics and Performance of the Metropolitan Council, CTR. FOR URB. AND REG. AFF. 
77 (1998) (explaining the Council’s considerations during the grant and loan 
approval process); see also INST. ON METRO. OPPORTUNITY, WHY ARE THE TWIN 
CITIES SO SEGREGATED? 13 (2015), https://www1.law.umn.edu/uploads/ed/00/
ed00c05a000fffeb881655f2e02e9f29/Why-Are-the-Twin-Cities-So-Segregated-2-26-
15.pdf (describing the Council’s use of state funds to incentivize integration during 
municipal growth). 
 4. Metropolitan Council, Housing Development Guide 44 (1985). 
 5. See, e.g., Myron Orfield, Land Use and Housing Policies to Reduce 
Concentrated Poverty and Racial Segregation, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 877, 919–21 
(2006) (describing the early successes of the Council in utilizing housing policy to 
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The statutory framework that founded and emboldened the 
Council in 1976 remains in force, but the Council’s commitment to 
integration in the past decade has been anything but forceful.  Once 
feared for its review and suspension policies, the Council now 
operates in an advisory capacity, one which has allowed political 
and commercial interests to shift affordable housing allocations 
away from suburban areas and toward central cities, where neither 
the infrastructure nor the tax base can hope to absorb affordable 
housing.6  Since 2014, the Metropolitan Interfaith Council on 
Affordable Housing (MICAH) has characterized this transition as 
one of neglect, whereby the Council refuses to exercise its full 
authority to combat rising de facto segregation in its seven 
constituent counties.7 
To reverse this pattern of re-segregation, the Metropolitan 
Council must once again utilize the full authority accorded by the 
Metropolitan Land Use Planning Act (LUPA)8 to provide for 
regional affordable housing needs and compel local governments to 
allocate their fair share of units.  In particular, the Council should 
use inclusionary zoning to achieve a threshold percentage of 
affordable units in all proposed municipal developments that reach 
its review board.  Inclusionary zoning, while a radical departure 
from current Council policy, remains a viable housing mechanism, 
one that the architects of LUPA expressly contemplated in 1974.9  
By coordinating the regional distribution of affordable housing in 
this way, the Council can work in tandem with local government 
units to foster heterogeneous, equal-opportunity communities in 
the Twin Cities. 
 
affirmatively further integration in the Twin Cities). 
 6. See INST. ON METRO. OPPORTUNITY, supra note 3, at 13–15 (describing the 
internal philosophy of the Council over time and how modern policy directs 
affordable housing units to central cities). 
 7. See Complaint at 2, Metropolitan Interfaith Council on Affordable Housing 
v. Minnesota, filed with H.U.D. on Nov. 10, 2014, https://dk-media.s3.
amazonaws.com/AA/AV/micah-org/downloads/292213/Complaint_Final_
Filed_2014_11_10.pdf (alleging that “[the State of Minnesota has] adopted, 
maintained, and enforced policies and practices with respect to land use and housing 
programs that have the purpose and effect of limiting the development of affordable 
housing in high-opportunity, majority-white communities and steering such units to 
low-opportunity, high-poverty communities, furthering racial and ethnic segregation 
in the Twin Cities region of Minnesota.”). 
 8. MINN. STAT. §§ 473.851–871 (2017). 
 9. § 473.859, subd. 2 (“A land use plan shall also include a housing element 
containing standards. . . including but not limited to the use of official controls and 
land use planning to promote the availability of land for the development of low and 
moderate income housing.”). 
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Part I of this Article examines the discretionary authority 
accorded to the Council under LUPA.  Part II examines the seminal 
fair-share case, South Burlington County NAACP v. Mount 
Laurel,10 and the burgeoning movement toward burden-sharing 
amongst interdependent municipalities.  Part III reflects upon the 
legislative history and early implementation of LUPA, both of which 
seized upon the Mount Laurel Doctrine and, consequently, 
demonstrated the ability of the Council to wield affirmative 
governmental devices to facilitate socioeconomic and racial 
integration. 
I. Regional Burden-Sharing: Statutory Underpinnings 
A. Toward Regional Governance 
In 1967, the Minnesota Legislature recognized the need for a 
“regional planning and coordinating body,” one that would help 
facilitate the growth of Minneapolis-St. Paul, a metropolitan area 
consisting of nearly three hundred separate local units of 
government.11  Shared challenges, such as transit, wastewater 
collection and treatment, and affordable housing, transcended local 
borders and demanded coordination at a regional level.12  The entity 
that emerged, not without controversy,13 was the Metropolitan 
Council of the Twin Cities, a public corporation and political 
subdivision of the state, tasked with overseeing regional governance 
and operations.14 
The Metropolitan Council presides over sixteen geographic 
districts, each represented by one governor-appointed member.15  
On behalf of the State of Minnesota, these unelected officials 
 
 10. S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel I), 336 A.2d 713 
(N.J. 1975). 
 11. History of the Council, METRO. COUNCIL (2016), https://metrocouncil.org/
About-Us/Publications-And-Resources/History-of-the-Council.aspx (noting how 
then-Governor Harold LeVander backed this vision of regional development by 
explaining that the Council “was conceived with the idea that we will be faced with 
more and more problems that will pay no heed to the boundary lines which mark the 
end of one community in this metropolitan area and the beginning of another.”). 
 12. See Heidenreich et al., The Metropolitan Council, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
160, 163 (2013) (describing the shared problems that drove the Minnesota 
Legislature to consider a regional growth strategy). 
 13. See ARTHUR NAFTALIN & JOHN BRANDL, PUB. NO. 08-80-058, THE TWIN 
CITIES REGIONAL STRATEGY 24 (1980) (describing the suburban communities’ desire 
to remain both fiscally and administratively distinct from the urban core and fierce 
opposition to the Council at the time of its inception). 
 14. § 473.123. 
 15. Id. at subd. 3(a). 
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possess wide discretion on “matters of metropolitan significance”16 
and are afforded considerable insulation from the public.17  
Together, these appointed officials are granted those powers 
deemed “necessary or convenient” to carry out the Council’s 
enumerated duties and responsibilities as codified by law.18 
The Council can best be understood as a steward of regional 
growth, and its operations inform prospective development at the 
local level.  From above, the Council sets the tone for growth with 
its decennial comprehensive development guide for orderly and 
economic development of the metropolitan area, as ordered by 
statute.19  This comprehensive guide, the Metropolitan 
Development Guide, must recognize “physical, social, or economic 
needs of the metropolitan area and those future developments 
which will have an impact on the entire area,” including land use.20  
With the issuing of the Metropolitan Development Guide, the 
Metropolitan Council communicates its vision for the trajectory of 
the region and its objectives for the future.21 
B. The Metropolitan Land Use Planning Act (LUPA) 
With the enactment of LUPA in 1976, the Minnesota 
Legislature provided the Council with the tools to realize its 
decennial vision.22  Acknowledging the interdependence of local 
government units in the Twin Cities, LUPA endeavors “to protect 
the health, safety and welfare of the residents of the metropolitan 
 
 16. § 473.173, subd. 1. 
 17. § 473.141, subd. 5 (providing that the Council Chairman serves “at the 
pleasure of the governor”); § 473.123, subd. 2 (providing that the governor appoints 
members and that initially the terms of appointees were staggered based on whether 
they represented even- or odd-numbered districts and that after the first staggered 
term for even- and odd-numbered districts passed, members would serve for a four-
year term).  This provision has been subject to much controversy, particularly with 
regard to the Council’s accountability and representativeness over the years.  See, 
e.g., MYRON ORFIELD ET AL., REGION: PLANNING THE FUTURE OF THE TWIN CITIES 79 
(2010).  Efforts to amend § 473.123 reached the Minnesota Senate in 1997 but were 
ultimately blocked by Governor Arne Carlson.  See, e.g., David Chanen, Senate OKs 
Bill to Make Met Council Elected Body; Carlson Says He’ll Veto, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis), May 13, 1997, at B3. 
 18. § 473.129, subd. 1. 
 19. MINN. STAT. § 473B.06, subd. 5 (2017) (requiring the Council to “prepare and 
adopt . . . a comprehensive  development guide for the metropolitan area.”). 
 20. Id. 
 21. See, e.g., METRO. COUNCIL, THRIVE 2040,  https://metrocouncil.org/Planning/
Publications-And-Resources/Thrive-MSP-2040-Plan-(1)/ThriveMSP2040.aspx (last 
accessed Feb. 18, 2018) (outlining the Council’s concerns and aspirations for regional 
development through 2040). 
 22. See MINN. STAT. § 473.851 (2017) (stating the legislative intent behind 
LUPA). 
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area and to ensure coordinated, orderly and economic 
development.”23  LUPA grants the Metropolitan Council substantial 
deference in coordinating and compelling growth at the regional 
level,24 and the Council may use this explicit statutory authority to 
direct housing efforts in two important ways. 
First, with the Council at the helm, LUPA required all local 
government units within its purview to submit a comprehensive 
plan for growth management, with regard to land use, public 
facilities, and urbanization, through 1990.25  Local government 
units are directed to craft “standards, plans and programs for 
providing adequate housing opportunities to meet existing and 
projected local and regional housing needs.”26  This land use plan, 
when implemented, must be tailored to provide “sufficient existing 
and new housing to meet the local unit’s share of the metropolitan 
area need for low and moderate income housing.”27 
Upon receipt, the Council is responsible for reviewing and 
reconciling these many comprehensive plans.28  The standard of 
review utilized by the Council for each comprehensive plan 
submission is whether “the plan is more likely than not to have a 
substantial impact on or contain a substantial departure from 
metropolitan system plans.”29  If the Council finds in the 
affirmative, it may request any modifications necessary to bring the 
plans into conformity with the Metropolitan Development Guide, 
prepared by the Council to “recognize and encompass physical, 
social and economic needs of the metropolitan area.”30  No local 
government may implement its comprehensive plan before 
receiving the Council’s statement and incorporating any 
modifications requested therein.31 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. See § 473.854 (providing guidelines for the Council and the ability to create, 
amend, and enforce comprehensive plans). 
 25. § 473.859, subd. 1. 
 26. Id. at subd. 2 (emphasis added).  This language is strikingly similar to that 
found in South Burlington County NAACP v. Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II), 456 
A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983).  The historical implication of this phrase necessarily informs 
the reading of LUPA with regard to inclusionary zoning and other affirmative 
housing mechanisms.  See discussion infra Part II(B). 
 27. § 473.859, subd. 4(3). 
 28. MINN. STAT. § 473.175, subd. 1 (2017). 
 29. Id. 
 30. MINN. STAT. § 473.145 (2017); see also MINN. STAT. § 473.175, subd. 3 (2017). 
 31. § 473.175, subd. 2.  After a successful first round of comprehensive planning, 
the Minnesota Legislature mandated decennial review, requiring each local 
government to review, amend (if necessary), and submit its comprehensive plan to 
the Council at least once every ten years.  MINN. STAT. § 473.864, subd. 2 (2017).  
This requirement remains in place, compelling local governments to periodically 
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In addition to comprehensive planning, LUPA grants the 
Council discretionary authority in the disbursement of state and 
federal funding to local entities.32  Applications by local entities are 
expected to specify the activities for which the funds will be used, 
as well as any persons involved in the proposed activities.33  The 
Council may “reasonably request” any other information it deems 
relevant to aid the approval process.34  This informational review is 
curtailed only by the requirement that the Council must base its 
decision on “the recipient’s demonstrated need and available 
financial resources.”35  As discussed below, however, this criteria is 
neither exhaustive nor narrowly construed by Minnesota courts; 
rather, the Council may consider a local government’s affordable 
housing performance in its final analysis.36 
In short, LUPA grants the Council broad authority to shape 
regional housing distribution as it sees fit.  The Council is not 
limited to mere suspension of new development; indeed, the Council 
may use state and federal funding to actively incentivize local 
implementation of housing initiatives.37  Both tools, explicitly 
granted under LUPA, were utilized by the Council for a decade to 
harmonize “local and regional housing needs.”38 
The text of LUPA remains intact, though its meaning remains 
hotly contested.39  In broad terms, the courts must adjudicate the 
Council’s role in combatting the crisis of racial and socioeconomic 
stratification across the seven-county area.40  This Article 
contributes to Metropolitan Council scholarship by testing the outer 
limits of LUPA; in particular, this Article advocates for a holistic 
reading of LUPA and, in light of legislative intent and relevant case 
 
reassess their priorities and confirm that such plans comport with evolving regional 
needs.  Id. 
 32. MINN. STAT. § 473.171 (2017). 
 33. MINN. STAT. § 473.867, subd. 3 (2017) (“Grants and loans shall be made 
subject to contracts between the council and the recipient specifying the use and 
disbursement of the funds and, for loans, the terms and conditions of repayment, and 
other appropriate matters.”). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See discussion infra Part II. 
 37. MINN. STAT. § 473.171 (2017). 
 38. § 473.859, subd. 2(c). 
 39. See Complaint, supra note 7; Complaint, Metropolitan Interfaith Council on 
Affordable Housing v. City of Minneapolis, filed with H.U.D. on Mar. 30, 2015, 
https://dk-media.s3.amazonaws.com/AA/AV/micahorg/downloads/294541/MICAH_
Complaint_to_HUD_-_Mpls._and_St._Paul_filed_March_30__2015.pdf. 
 40. See Complaint, supra note 7. 
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law, asserts that the Council has authority to impose mandatory 
inclusionary zoning requirements upon constituent municipalities. 
II. The Burden-Sharing Revolution: Mount Laurel41 and 
Beyond 
While LUPA remains largely intact, the authority of the 
Council to affirmatively shape the regional housing market remains 
contested.  Certain language in LUPA, however, is particularly 
instructive as to the Minnesota Legislature’s intent.  The phrase 
“existing and projected local and regional housing needs”42 tracks 
almost identically with core phrasing in fair-share case law of the 
time period.  The following discussion argues that, by deliberately 
using these words, LUPA imports the full weight and the legacy 
behind them. 
A. The Mount Laurel Doctrine 
In 1975, the New Jersey Supreme Court began laying the 
groundwork for a regional housing strategy.  In doing so, the Court 
was forced to reconcile many of the same local and regional tensions 
that underlie the Twin Cities’ affordable housing debate, and the 
doctrine43 that emerged was integral in establishing fair-share 
housing policies nationwide.  While Mount Laurel I first explored 
the relationship between local and regional need,44 Mount Laurel II 
is credited with operationalizing this concept and, in doing so, 
created concrete regulatory tools to ensure the proliferation of low- 
and moderate-income housing.45  The language with which the New 
Jersey Supreme Court harmonized local and regional housing policy 
will prove instructive in interpreting Minnesota Statute § 
473.859,46 which tracks the iconic language of Mount Laurel I. 
i. Mount Laurel I 
Mount Laurel I arose in the midst of a housing “crisis,” one 
characterized by a “desperate need for housing, especially of decent 
living accommodations economically suitable for low and moderate 
 
 41. S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel I), 336 A.2d 713 
(N.J. 1975). 
 42. § 473.859, subd. 2(c). 
 43. The so-called “Mount Laurel Doctrine” is the result of two New Jersey 
Supreme Court cases.  See Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d 713; S. Burlington Cty. NAACP 
v. Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II), 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983). 
 44. Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 724. 
 45. Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 448. 
 46. § 473.859, subd. 2. 
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income families.”47  Though Defendant Mount Laurel was but one 
municipality, the Court acknowledged the regional breadth of the 
problem,48 and this profoundly shaped the issue moving forward.  
Furthermore, the Court looked to the historical growth of Mount 
Laurel as a blossoming industrial node, one which drew prospective 
residents of mixed socioeconomic and racial backgrounds out of 
central cities, like Camden, and into the promising township.49  It 
was through these broader frames of analysis that the Court boldly 
confronted segregative patterns of development in the South Jersey 
metropolitan area. 
In 1972, Mount Laurel enacted a zoning ordinance to guide 
land use in that age of unprecedented growth.  The ordinance 
delivered a simple injunction to future developers:  future 
residential growth was limited to single-family detached 
dwellings.50  Other types of dwellings—including multi-family 
garden apartments, mobile home parks, and multi-family 
dwellings—were strictly forbidden.51  The plaintiffs, predominantly 
Black and Hispanic “outsiders,” challenged this restriction on the 
grounds that it constructively excluded low- and medium-income 
residential arrangements.52  In this way, the case involved two 
issues of import:  whether townships, like Mount Laurel, had the 
authority to prohibit certain types of housing, and whether said 
townships are obligated to “make realistically possible an 
appropriate variety and choice of housing.”53 
While the Court acknowledged that Mount Laurel’s zoning 
policy was grounded in a manifest desire to “keep down local taxes 
on property,”54 it nevertheless grappled with the classist undertones 
of the ordinance in practice.  The land-use regulations perpetuated 
de facto segregation of various categories of persons, for whom it 
became “physically and economically impossible to provide low and 
moderate income housing.”55  Though stopping short of statements 
 
 47. 336 A.2d at 716–17 (quoting Governor William T. Cahill’s messages to the 
New Jersey Legislature). 
 48. Id. at 716 (“The implications of the issue presented are indeed broad and far-
reaching, extending much beyond these particular plaintiffs and the boundaries of 
this particular municipality.”). 
 49. Id. at 717. 
 50. Id. at 729. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 717–18. 
 53. Id. at 724. 
 54. Id. at 723 (“There cannot be the slightest doubt that the reason for this course 
of conduct has been to keep down local taxes on property.”) (emphasis in original).  
The implication is that multi-family development will cause taxes to increase. 
 55. Id. at 724. 
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of class animus, Mount Laurel conceded that the necessary result 
of a tax-minimization policy was that “low and moderate income 
housing [would be] intentionally excluded.”56  Insofar as single-
family dwellings constitute the most expensive type of housing 
possible for prospective buyers,57 entire swaths of the population 
were left without “pecuniarily feasible”58 housing options. 
Finding such displacement untenable, the Supreme Court 
invalidated the zoning ordinance and set forth the gold standard for 
regional housing strategy.59  The Court declared that developing 
municipalities must make “realistically possible” an appropriate 
variety and choice of housing.60  More importantly, the Court held 
that a developing municipality must “affirmatively afford th[e] 
opportunity [for low- and moderate-income housing], at least to the 
extent of the municipality’s fair share of the present and prospective 
regional need therefor.”61  The larger implication of Mount Laurel I, 
then, was that municipalities must zone primarily for the living 
welfare of people and not for the benefit of the local tax rate.  In 
particular, a municipality cannot expand in a policy vacuum; 
rather, each locality has an “affirmative obligation to cooperate, 
where appropriate, in regional planning efforts.”62 
While the fair-share formula arising in Mount Laurel I would 
require further clarity from the New Jersey Supreme Court,63 the 
sentiment was a revolutionary one:  regional land-use planning 
bodies may subvert local autonomy in order to improve general 
welfare in the aggregate.  Mount Laurel I established a persuasive 
fair-share standard,64 and it remains a “cornerstone of land use 
courses in all of our nation’s law schools.”65 
 
 56. Id. at 729. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 729 (“Certainly, [single-family dwellings] are not pecuniarily feasible 
for low and moderate income families, most young people and many elderly and 
retired persons . . . .”). 
 59. Id. at 724–25. 
 60. Id. at 724. 
 61. Id. (emphasis added). 
 62. Id. at 744 (Pashman, J., concurring). 
 63. S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II), 456 A.2d 390, 
410 (N.J. 1983). 
 64. Courts in Oregon and New York have relied upon Mount Laurel I in shaping 
fair-share obligations within their own states.  See discussion infra Part III(C). 
 65. Mount Laurel Doctrine, FAIR SHARE HOUSING CTR., http://fairshare
housing.org/mount-laurel-doctrine (last accessed Feb. 4, 2018). 
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B. Mount Laurel II 
Despite the rousing symbolic victory for affordable housing 
advocates in Mount Laurel I, the immediate results were neither 
uniform nor satisfying.66  Though many municipalities amended 
their zoning ordinances to account for local and “regional need,” the 
Mount Laurel Doctrine lacked clarity as to what those terms 
meant.67  In reference to Mount Laurel I, lower courts had many 
operational questions, among them:  What is a “developing” 
municipality?  What constitutes a “fair share” of affordable housing?  
How should municipalities calculate such a figure?  In 1983, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court revisited the controversial Mount 
Laurel Doctrine to resolve these questions and definitively 
authorize inclusionary zoning among qualifying municipalities.68 
Mount Laurel II clarified the original Mount Laurel Doctrine 
by creating a fair share formula to measure each municipality’s 
obligation to provide affordable housing.  Principally, Mount Laurel 
II enjoined all municipalities “to provide a realistic opportunity for 
the construction of their fair share of the region’s present lower 
income housing need generated by present dilapidated or 
overcrowded lower income units.”69  The Court envisioned a system 
led by regional need, to which each municipality’s personal 
contribution was anchored.70  In doing so, the Court dispensed with 
the “developing” municipality designation, instead requiring 
 
 66. Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 411 (“[W]e are far from where we had hoped to 
be and nowhere near where we should be with regard to the administration of the 
[D]octrine in our courts.”).  Notably, Mount Laurel had not yet rescinded its 
exclusionary ordinance, and the Court suspected “widespread non-compliance” with 
the Mount Laurel Doctrine throughout the region.  Id. at 410. 
 67. Id. at 410 (“[The six cases appearing before the court] demonstrate the need 
to put some steel into that [D]octrine.  The deficiencies in its application range from 
uncertainty and inconsistency at the trial level to inflexible review criteria at the 
appellate level.”). 
 68. See id. at at 409–11. 
 69. Id. at 433. 
 70. Id.  The Court recognized that each municipality has distinct spatial 
limitations which influence its capacity to absorb new affordable units.  For this 
reason, certain areas within the region may demand higher shares of affordable 
units.  For example: 
[m]unicipalities located in ‘growth areas’ may, of course, have 
an obligation to meet the present need of the region that goes 
far beyond that generated in the municipality itself; there may 
be some municipalities, however, in growth areas where the 
portion of the region’s present need generated by that 
municipality far exceeds the municipality’s fair share.  Id. 
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contribution by “all municipalities,” according to individualized 
capacity assessments.71 
With the relevant stakeholders identified, the Court faced its 
greatest challenge:  creating a workable fair-share formula.72  At 
the regional level, planners must complete the three following 
tasks:  “identifying the relevant region, determining its present and 
prospective housing needs, and allocating those needs to the 
municipality or municipalities involved.”73  The Court ultimately 
delegated the task to the judiciary, whose adjudication of the Mount 
Laurel litigation would inform determinations as to regional need.74  
Though plotting the spatial dimensions of each region would be left 
to the panel, the Court offered a guiding principle:  a region is a 
“general area which constitutes, more or less, the housing market 
area of which the subject municipality is a part, and from which the 
prospective population of the municipality would substantially be 
drawn, in the absence of exclusionary zoning.”75  As to the fair share 
assessment, the Court offered the following suggestions: 
Formulas that accord substantial weight to employment 
opportunities in the municipality, especially new employment 
accompanied by substantial ratables, shall be favored; formulas 
that have the effect of tying prospective lower income housing 
needs to the present proportion of lower income residents to the 
total population of a municipality shall be disfavored; formulas 
that have the effect of unreasonably diminishing the share 
because of a municipality’s successful exclusion of lower income 
housing in the past shall be disfavored.76 
Though local governments were responsible for carrying their 
fair share of regional need (as determined above), the Court realized 
the need for incentive alignment.  Invalidation of restrictive 
municipal zoning practices alone would not bring about the 
constitutionally-mandated housing opportunities, nor would 
planners meet inclusivity goals without some meaningful stick or 
 
 71. Id. at 408, 433.  “[T]he fact that a municipality is fully developed does not 
eliminate this obligation although, obviously, it may affect the extent of the 
obligation and the timing of its satisfaction.”  Id. at 418. 
 72. Id. at 436. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Specifically, Mount Laurel II litigation would appear before an expert panel 
of three judges, each of whom were assigned to a particular subsector of New Jersey.  
The hope for this panel was that “a regional pattern for the entire state [would] be 
established, as [would] a fairly consistent determination of regional needs on both 
an area and statewide basis.”  Id. at 439. 
 75. Id. at 440 (quoting Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Madison, 371 A.2d 1192, 
1223 (N.J. 1977)). 
 76. Id. 
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carrot to guide them.77  Rather, the Court reasoned, local 
government units must sufficiently coerce (or, at the very least, 
induce) compliance through regulatory land-use controls.78  At this 
critical juncture, the Court authorized the use of affirmative 
governmental devices to make affordable housing opportunities 
realistic.  While the Court identified lower-income density bonuses79 
and mandatory set-asides80 as viable devices, it did not limit the 
regulatory ingenuity of local governments, which were authorized 
“to create other devices and methods for meeting fair share 
obligations.”81  Armed with these affirmative devices, communities 
could (and do) meet their fair share obligations in furtherance of the 
regional housing strategy.82 
Although Mount Laurel II was not decided until 1983, years 
after the drafting of LUPA, its treatment of the core phrase “fair 
share of the present and prospective regional . . . need” is 
instructive.83  Recognizing the need for clarity, the Court elucidated 
a two-tier planning strategy:  enlist a regional body to determine 
the needs of the regional population, and then empower local 
governments with the affirmative tools necessary to address them.  
The usage of density bonuses and mandatory set-asides to induce 
affordable housing on the ground injected the Mount Laurel 
Doctrine with a dose of realism sufficient to overcome the perverse 
 
 77. Id. at 442–43. 
 78. As the Court wrote, this realist approach was critical to resolving the 
judgement-compliance gap:  “If it is plain, and it is, that unless we require the use of 
affirmative measures the constitutional guarantee that protects poor people from 
municipal exclusion will exist ‘only on paper,’ then the only ‘appropriate remedy’ is 
the use of affirmative measures.”  Id. at 448. 
 79. A density bonus “permits [a] developer to build more total units than the local 
land use plan would normally allow, in return for building a specified number of 
below-market rate units.”  MINN. HOUSING FIN. AGENCY, STUDY OF INCLUSIONARY 
HOUSING INITIATIVES 7 (2002). 
 80. In a municipality imposing mandatory set-asides, new residential 
developments over a certain number of units must “set aside” a minimum threshold 
percentage of low- to medium-income units.  See Rosalind M. Mytelka & Arnold K. 
Mytelka, Exclusionary Zoning: A Consideration of Remedies, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 
1, 12 (1976).  Montgomery County, Maryland is a prime illustration of a mandatory 
set-aside municipality:  for every new development of fifty or more units, fifteen 
percent of the units must be affordable, relative to local market rate for moderately-
priced houses.  MINN. HOUSING FIN. AGENCY, supra note 79, at 8. 
 81. Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 445.  The New Jersey zoning framework 
“permits any reasonable scheme which comports with the legislative standards and 
thus leaves ample room for new ideas.”  Kozesnik v. Montgomery, 131 A.2d 1, 9 (N.J. 
1957) (emphasis added). 
 82. See Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 442–52 (describing the use of various 
affirmative measures, including case studies demonstrating the benefits and 
drawbacks of each). 
 83. Id. at 413. 
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incentives of a tax-led system.  This mode of incentive alignment, 
says Mount Laurel II, is necessary to empower local governments to 
shoulder their fair share of regional need.84 
III. Nesting LUPA Within the Affirmative Burden-Sharing 
Revolution 
The present iteration of the Council has maintained the 
position that it may not affirmatively require local communities to 
provide affordable housing in this way.85  In the alternative, the 
Council relies upon Alliance for Metropolitan Stability v. 
Metropolitan Council86 for the proposition that the Council 
maintains discretion with respect to how it fulfills its statutory 
responsibilities, so long as the Council acts with a “good faith belief 
that it is reflecting the legislative intent of new regulating 
legislation.”87  As discussed above, LUPA was passed in an era of 
regionalism, which directly infiltrated the language of LUPA and 
belies any assertion of mere coincidence.  The following analysis will 
make the case that the Mount Laurel II interpretation of “adequate 
housing opportunities to meet existing and projected local and 
regional housing needs”88 is dispositive, given the force of this 
language in other jurisdictions, the findings of LUPA’s principal 
architect, and past Council behavior.  This evidence points to a 
single conclusion:  a good-faith interpretation of LUPA must give 
way to inclusionary zoning. 
A. The Unique Municipal Interdependence of the Twin 
Cities Heightens Regional Authority to Coordinate 
Growth 
Shortly before the drafting of LUPA, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court heard Burnsville v. Onischuk,89 a case that underscored the 
 
 84. Id. at 448. 
 85. See, e.g., EDWARD G. GOETZ, KAREN CHAPPLE & BARBARA LUKERMANN, THE 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING LEGACY OF THE 1976 LAND USE PLANNING ACT 16 (2002) 
(“[The Council] can’t say . . . [local governments] have to provide affordable housing.  
All we can say is that [they] have to provide the opportunity to not discriminate 
against affordable housing.” (quoting an unnamed Metropolitan Council staff 
member)). 
 86. See generally All. for Metro. Stability v. Metro. Council, 671 N.W.2d 905, 921 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that, where the Minnesota Legislature has left aspects 
of LUPA undefined, the implication is that the Council has regulatory discretion to 
interpret and execute the law). 
 87. Id. at 909. 
 88. MINN. STAT. § 473.859, subd. 2(c) (2017). 
 89. See 222 N.W.2d 523 (Minn. 1974) (finding that a statutory revenue-sharing 
scheme did not rise to the level of unconstitutional lack of uniformity in taxation). 
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need for cooperation among neighboring communities in the Twin 
Cities.  In construing the controversial Metropolitan Fiscal 
Disparities Act,90 the Court was forced to determine whether local 
communities could be required to deposit a percentage of their 
commercial and industrial property tax revenue into a regional 
fund.91  Under the Metropolitan Fiscal Disparities Act, this regional 
tax revenue pool was reallocated to constituent municipalities “in 
direct relation to need and inverse relation to fiscal capacity.”92  
This redistributive model endeavored to align incentives among the 
many local communities that would otherwise engage in a race-to-
the-bottom to capture commercial-industrial value by the continual 
lowering of local tax rates.93 
The lower court held that this cooperative policy violated the 
General and Uniform Clause of the Minnesota Constitution, which 
requires that “taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of 
subjects, and shall be levied and collected for public purposes.”94  
This lower court abided by the classic interpretation of such 
uniformity clauses,95 which treated local governments as separate 
but indiscriminate entities for tax purposes.  Under such an 
interpretation, no local community could be forced to share the 
growth of its commerce and industry with other communities within 
a predefined region; indeed, local governments were pitted against 
their neighbors, each embracing growth for growth’s sake.96  As 
Citizens League explained at the time, “[w]ithout [the Fiscal 
Disparities Act], local governments in the Twin Cities area [were] 
unwilling captives of the local property tax structure—compelled to 
 
 90. See 1971 Minn. Laws Extra Session at 2286–99 (instituting a redistribution 
system for revenues among local governments in the Twin Cities metropolitan area). 
 91. In particular, the act contemplated “pooling 40 percent of the increase 
throughout the area of all commercial-industrial valuation subsequent to January 2, 
1971.”  Onischuk, 222 N.W.2d at 525. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 527; see also MINN. CONST. art. 10, § 1 (noting that the Minnesota 
Constitution has been revised since Onischuk and now reads “Taxes shall be uniform 
upon the same class of subjects and shall be levied and collected for public 
purposes . . . .”). 
 95. As Professor Myron Orfield points out, “[s]uch efforts had always been voided 
by Minnesota courts and famously disallowed in the neighboring state of Wisconsin 
in the leading case of Buse v. Smith [74 Wis. 2d 550 (1976)] in which a state wide 
[sic] school property tax sharing system was declared unconstitutional under 
Wisconsin’s very similar Uniformity Clause.”  Letter from the Inst. of Metro. 
Opportunity to Libby Starling (Nov. 15, 2013) at 24, https://www.ramseycounty.us/
sites/default/files/Departments/2014%20Analysis%20of%20Impediments%20
comments.pdf. 
 96. Id. 
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make decisions and take actions to increase their tax base, without 
significant regard for orderly development, either in their own 
communities or in the metropolitan area.”97 
Recognizing this misalignment of incentives, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court pivoted sharply, holding that the “viable, fluid, and 
transient” nature of society warranted a modern reading of the 
Uniformity Clause.98  The interdependence of the many 
municipalities was the centerpiece of the Court’s decision, which 
made clear that local development was no longer a zero-sum game: 
The seven-county metropolitan area, it is pointed out, has a 
high degree of mobility and political, social, and economic 
interdependence.  There is an increasing use of facilities in one 
municipality by those who reside or work in a different 
municipality.  The payment of taxes in a metropolitan area may 
have only slight relationship to the use and enjoyment which 
residents make of other areas in the district.99 
In other words, the fluid interaction of citizens across 
traditional urban and suburban lines distorted the traditional 
calculus of tax contribution.  What were once silos of development 
were now sharing resources and opportunities, so it followed that 
the tax revenue generated from this regional system should also be 
shared.100  The equalizing effect of the Fiscal Disparities Act helped 
lessen the siren song of commercial-industrial development for 
communities, which could now pursue amenities of a different sort, 
including affordable housing for the region’s low-income and 
moderate-income residents.101 
In Onischuk, the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the 
assertion that municipalities were discrete, independent 
governments for the purposes of the Uniformity Clause.102  Without 
a moderating influence from above, local government units are wont 
to compete for high-value tax uses, whether commercial-industrial 
or residential, at the expense of low-income and moderate-income 
residents.103  While this case concerned only the Fiscal Disparities 
Act, the subtext of this opinion is hard to miss:  regional prosperity 
 
 97. Brief for Citizens League as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendants-
Respondents at 12, Burnsville v. Onischuk, 222 N.W.2d 523 (Minn. 1974). 
 98. Onischuk, 222 N.W.2d at 532–33. 
 99. Id. at 532. 
 100. As the Court noted, “residents of highly developed commercial areas do enjoy 
direct benefits from the existence of adjacent municipalities which provide open 
space, lakes, parks, golf courses, zoos, fairgrounds, low-density housing areas, 
churches, schools and hospitals.”  Id. at 532 (emphasis added). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 532–33. 
 103. Id. 
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may require the dilution of local autonomy.  In pushing back against 
this race-to-the-bottom, Onischuk represented a sea change in 
interdependency and burden-sharing across the Twin Cities. 
The Onischuk Court recognized the perverse incentives 
created by a tax-minimization growth strategy:  (a) capture high-
value land, (b) exploit this land in the most lucrative fashion 
(whether residential or commercial-industrial), and (c) use this 
revenue to offset property tax rates for all residents.104  This 
strategy had the effect of frustrating “well-considered housing 
policies for both low-income and moderate-income residents”105 of 
the Twin Cities region, just as it did one year later in Mount Laurel 
Township.  Onischuk boldly recognized the give-and-take between 
neighboring municipalities, and this holding underlies the 
statement of “interdependence” in LUPA just two years later.106  
The interdependence of the Twin Cities, as enshrined in Onischuk, 
must underlie any reading of Minnesota statutes enacted in its 
wake. 
B. LUPA’s Visionaries Intended to Impose Integrative, 
Fair-Share Housing Obligations upon the Council 
After the New York Court of Appeals upheld a staged growth 
system in Golden v. Planning Board Town of Ramapo,107 the 
Council was emboldened to move forward with its own vision for 
regional planning.108  To that end, the Council sought out Robert 
Freilich, a notable land use scholar who had successfully designed 
the Ramapo system,109 to “study and recommend a legal policy for 
regional growth in accordance with the Council’s decision to pursue 
growth in a timed and sequential manner.”110  Submitted to the 
Council in January 1974, the final report was highly influential in 
sculpting LUPA.111  A close examination of Freilich’s findings helps 
 
 104. Id. at 529. 
 105. Id. at 532; see also S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel 
I), 336 A.2d 713, 723–25 (N.J. 1975). 
 106. MINN. STAT. § 473.851 (1976). 
 107. 285 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y.1972). 
 108. See discussion infra Part I; Letter from the Inst. of Metro. Opportunity, supra 
note 95, at 19. 
 109. Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d at 291–94. 
 110. Robert H. Freilich & John W. Ragsdale, Jr., Timing and Sequential Controls 
— The Essential Basis for Effective Regional Planning: An Analysis for the New 
Directions for Land Use Control in the Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Region, 58 
MINN. L. REV. 1009, 1009 (1974). 
 111. Letter from the Inst. of Metro. Opportunity, supra note 95, at 19. 
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to breathe further life into the words of LUPA, particularly as they 
pertain to fair-share housing policy. 
Robert Freilich had no doubt that his recommendations would 
be controversial, noting that “the control of growth . . . arouse[s] 
deep emotions and strong concerns, because the solution to the 
problem seems to strike at the very basis of American tradition:  
absolute ownership of private property.”112  The idea of external 
actors dictating local growth was anathema to American land-use 
jurisprudence, which had, since Euclid in 1926, accorded such 
powers to local government units.113  Freilich expressly lamented 
this fragmentation of authority, which “in many instances . . . is an 
active impediment to the goals of effective land use control.”114  Such 
a task, Freilich argued, was best surrendered to a regional body, 
empowered by statute to coordinate shared resources.115 
Prior to LUPA, the Council was sorely limited in its ability to 
enact meaningful change on the ground.  Though its foundational 
statutes accorded substantial oversight of sewage and waste control 
across the seven-county area, the remainder of its influence was 
illusory:  it could review and recommend strategy but lacked an 
affirmative stick-and-carrot strategy with which to compel local 
cooperation.116  Noting the Council’s agentic limitations,117 as a 
creature of the State, Freilich set forth specific criteria that would 
underpin the forthcoming LUPA. 
In order to give all residents a “realistic opportunity”118 to live 
in functional neighborhoods, Freilich argued that the Council must 
be empowered to “review comprehensive planning of local 
 
 112. Freilich, supra note 110, at 1089. 
 113. Village of Euclid, v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389–90 (1926) (finding 
zoning ordinances to be constitutional, provided they reasonably flow from a 
locality’s police power). 
 114. Freilich, supra note 110, at 1089. 
 115. Id. at 1013.  In making the case for consolidated land-use authority, Freilich 
appealed to the interdependency theory found in the recent Onischuk decision, 
stating “[i]t is becoming increasingly apparent that there are many advantages to 
control at a higher level over land use problems.  A number of crucial land use 
problems are not local in either effect or origin, and the scope of effective regulation 
must be commensurate with them.”  Id. 
 116. As Freilich observed at the time, “the Council stands in the unenviable 
position of a coordinator with very limited means to enforce coordination upon those 
who do not wish to cooperate. . . . Apart from sewage and solid waste control, 
however, the Council’s powers are basically restricted to review and 
recommendation.”  Id. at 1021–22. 
 117. “The Council, as a creature of the legislative will, can exercise only those 
powers delegated to it.”  Id. at 1021. 
 118. S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II), 456 A.2d 390, 
433 (N.J. 1983). 
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communities to insure that local plans and implementing 
ordinances are in accord and consistent with regional planning, 
particularly housing and capital improvements.”119  This 
comprehensive review power, which was formally codified in 
Minnesota Statute § 473.859, aimed to harmonize local plans with 
the regional scheme, which was, itself, “far less likely to be 
influenced by parochial considerations, and far more likely to be in 
accord with the scope of the problem.”120  With this broader view of 
the moving parts, the Council could quarterback affordable housing 
allocation, siting low-income and moderate-income housing in 
participating municipalities,121 while suspending further 
development in localities too concerned with property tax 
minimization to welcome the region’s poor. 
While no doubt progressive, this housing policy would help 
realize a core objective of the Metropolitan Council, as stated in 
1973:  “To decrease residential segregation by race, class and 
income level.  To reduce the concentration of lower income families 
and individuals in the older areas of the region and increase housing 
choice for lower income persons throughout the area.”122  Freilich 
stressed that, for such a vision to be realized, the Metropolitan 
Council required the ability to integrate once-segregated suburbs 
from above, even those composed of well-off and historically White 
residents, in order to spread the wealth of opportunity that lay 
there.123  Such “fair share” plans, in Freilich’s eyes, were not mere 
options but were, rather, a necessity if the Council was to 
accomplish its stated objectives.124  This particular sentiment of 
targeting suburbs as the next frontier for affordable housing was 
taken to heart by the Council in its early years with stunning 
results.125 
In conclusion, research behind LUPA devoted considerable 
time and energy to remediating racial, class, and income disparity 
in the Twin Cities.  Freilich’s core contention, that effective growth 
requires a heavy-handed regional organ, is spelled out in the report.  
The comprehensive review authority that logically emerged from 
 
 119. Freilich, supra note 110, at 1090. 
 120. Id. at 1027. 
 121. Id. at 1084. 
 122. TWIN CITIES METRO. COUNCIL, DISCUSSION STATEMENT ON METROPOLITAN 
DEVELOPMENT POLICY 14 (Oct. 17, 1973) [hereinafter DISCUSSION STATEMENT]. 
 123. Freilich stated plainly that “[t]he provision of low-moderate income housing, 
particularly job-linked housing in the suburbs, is now necessary to avoid further 
concentration and blight in the core.”  Freilich, supra note 110, at 1084–1085. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See discussion infra Part III(D). 
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that premise found its way into the language and sentiment of 
LUPA, tracking almost exactly with Freilich’s demands.  While the 
applications of this power were many, Freilich saw its unique 
potential to erase firmly-entrenched neighborhood patterns and to 
instead facilitate the sharing of valuable regional opportunities in 
land and employment.  These precepts must continue to guide an 
honest reading of LUPA as intended by its drafters. 
C. The Words “Fair Share of the Present and Prospective 
Regional Need”126 Trigger Fair Share Housing 
Obligations 
As discussed above, case law immediately preceding LUPA 
laid the foundation for a viable regional affordable housing strategy.  
By requiring interdependent127 municipalities to shoulder their 
“fair share of the present and prospective regional need”128 for 
affordable housing, the Mount Laurel formula imposes affirmative 
obligations upon local and regional planners.  In recognizing the 
fluidity of modern society, the Mount Laurel cases129 pushed back 
against parochialism, encouraging growth in a manner that ensures 
families of all socioeconomic strata the “realistic opportunity” to live 
in the communities of their choosing.130  The near-identical 
phrasing in LUPA should import the full legacy of these cases and, 
consequently, authorize the same affirmative solutions to racial and 
socioeconomic segregation. 
The enduring legacy of certain legal phrasing is supported by 
the canons of statutory interpretation, rules of construction “of 
sufficiently frequent use in the past to give them a reliability, a 
validity independent of the reasoning on which they rest.”131  One 
such canon, as articulated by scholar Karl N. Llewellyn, may be 
stated as follows:  “Words and phrases which have received judicial 
construction before enactment are to be understood according to 
 
 126. S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel I), 336 A.2d 713, 
724–25 (N.J. 1975). 
 127. Burnsville v. Onischuk, 222 N.W.2d 523, 532 (Minn. 1974). 
 128. Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 724. 
 129. Id.; S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II), 456 A.2d 
390 (N.J. 1983). 
 130. Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 433. 
 131. Michael Sinclair, “Only a Sith Thinks Like That”: Llewellyn’s “Dueling 
Canons,” Pairs Thirteen to Sixteen, 53 N.Y.L.S. L. Rev. 953, 954 (2008).  As Sinclair 
explains, these canons are aids to judicial interpretation and have persuasive value, 
unless “trumped by express statutory language or by clear evidence of legislative 
intent to the contrary.”  Id. 
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that construction.”132  Case law can prove immensely helpful in 
construing certain phrases which reappear, time and time again, in 
similar statutes.  As Felix Frankfurter once opined most eloquently, 
“[w]ords of art bring their art with them,”133 and both courts and 
legislatures must presume that such art is imported intentionally 
into a statute when written.134 
When applied to the words “fair share of the present and 
prospective regional need therefore,” this canon is instructive.  This 
phrase, as written in Mount Laurel I135 and clarified in Mount 
Laurel II,136 authorizes housing as a regional system, one that may 
be coordinated forcefully from above to ensure stability and 
participation among all constituent municipalities.  The Mount 
Laurel cases, together, constitute one of the most famous doctrines,  
in all of land-use law, the Mount Laurel Doctrine, and their 
contribution was a groundbreaking one.137 
In step with the canon of “Words Judicially Defined,” other 
jurisdictions have seized upon the key language of the Mount 
Laurel Doctrine to give their own land-use statutes meaning.  In 
Seaman v. City of Durham,138 the Land Conservation and 
Development Commission of the State of Oregon (LCDC) grappled 
with the scope of its fair share statute and turned to Mount Laurel 
I for guidance.139  Municipalities within the Portland Metropolitan 
 
 132. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules 
or Canons of About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 403 
(1950).  This is derived from Henry Campbell Black’s canon of “Words Judicially 
Defined,” which is stated as follows:  “Words and phrases in a statute which have 
received a settled judicial construction before its enactment are to be understood 
according to that construction, unless the statute clearly requires them to bear a 
different meaning.”  HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION 
AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS 186 (2d ed. 1911). 
 133. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. 
L. REV. 527, 537 (1947). 
 134. Sinclair, supra note 131, at 958. 
 135. S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel I), 336 A.2d 713, 
724–25 (N.J. 1975). 
 136. Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 433. 
 137. Norman Williams, renowned land-use scholar, characterized Mount Laurel I 
as “the most important zoning case since [Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 
U.S. 365 (1926)].”  Norman Williams, A Major Transition in American Planning Law, 
27 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 33, 33 (1975).  Indeed, this holding questioned the 
sanctity of local zoning authority established in Euclid, instead situating questions 
of police power and general welfare at the regional level.  Id.; see also Village of 
Euclid, 272 U.S. at 389–90.  Civil rights advocates were similarly awestruck by the 
radical potential of Mount Laurel I, which has been called “one of the most significant 
civil rights cases in the United States since Brown v. Board of Education [347 U.S. 
483] (1954).”  Mount Laurel Doctrine, supra note 65, at 1. 
 138. 1 LCDC 283, 288 (No. 77-025) (1978); see also BLACK, supra note 132. 
 139. Seaman, 1 LCDC at 290. 
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Area are required to submit comprehensive plans that account for 
“adequate numbers of housing units at price ranges and rent levels 
which are commensurate with the financial capabilities of Oregon 
households and allow for flexibility of housing location, type and 
density.”140  At issue was a Durham, Oregon zoning ordinance that, 
much like that passed by Mount Laurel Township in the early 
1970s, encouraged an impermissible level of “economic and social 
homogeneity” that would cause ripple effects through the regional 
housing market.141  Drawing from the language of Mount Laurel I, 
the LCDC declared the ordinance invalid, finding that “planning 
jurisdictions must consider the needs of the relevant region in 
arriving at a fair allocation of housing types” and that “each town 
[must] provide[] its fair share of low-cost housing needed by the 
region.”142  A similar deference to Mount Laurel’s fair share legacy 
has appeared in New York,143 New Hampshire,144 and Rhode 
Island.145 
As mentioned above, Minnesota Statute § 473.859 tracks this 
storied language almost exactly when it requires local government 
units to craft comprehensive plans ensuring “adequate housing 
opportunities to meet existing and projected local and regional 
housing needs.”146  Upon completion, a local comprehensive plan is 
submitted to the Council, which must give approval only if the plan 
comports with the regional allocation strategy.147  By assigning this 
statutory obligation to the Council, LUPA effectively requires the 
Council to ensure the fair allocation of affordable housing 
 
 140. Id. at 289. 
 141. Id. at 291. 
 142. Id. at 290 (emphasis added). 
 143. Berenson v. New Castle, 67 N.Y.S.2d 669, 677 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) 
(remanding a dispute over zoning to the Town Board for appropriate “fair share” 
analysis and directing the Town Board to rezone plaintiffs’ property for multi-family 
use). 
 144. See Beck v. Raymond, 394 A.2d 847, 852 (N.H. 1978) (“An ideal solution to 
the problem of parochial growth restrictions is effective regional or state-wide land-
use planning . . . insuring that each municipality bears its fair share of the burden 
of increased growth.” (emphasis added)); see also Britton v. Chester, 595 A.2d 492, 
495 (N.H. 1991) (drawing upon Mount Laurel I & II and Beck to impose fair share 
obligations upon the Town of Chester). 
 145. Municipalities in Rhode Island are required to prepare similar 
comprehensive plans, which must include “the identification of existing housing 
patterns, an analysis of existing and forecasted housing needs, and identification of 
areas suitable for future housing development or rehabilitation.”  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 
45-22.2-6(b)(6) (2011) (emphasis added).  Such existing and future housing analysis 
take into account “local, regional, and statewide concerns.”  Id. at (b)(7). 
 146. MINN. STAT. § 473.859, subd. 2(c) (2017) (emphasis added). 
 147. § 473.858. 
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opportunities, even at great financial and political cost to local 
politicians. 
D. The Council Has Wielded Affirmative, Interventionist 
Powers in the Past 
In its early form, the Council exhibited top-down control over 
the regional housing market, ensuring that low-income and 
moderate-income families had a “realistic opportunity”148 to find 
affordable housing.  The Council’s forceful approach to 
comprehensive planning placed the Twin Cities at the forefront of 
neighborhood integration in LUPA’s first decade.149  The affirmative 
policy described below, grounded in LUPA, undermines the 
Council’s present contention that it never had Mount Laurel-type 
powers; rather, the evidence suggests that the Council had, and still 
has, broad authority to enforce local fair-share goals. 
i. Comprehensive Planning Power 
As discussed in Part I, each local government unit is required 
to submit a comprehensive plan that delineates its growth strategy 
for the coming decade.150  Clearly stated in LUPA is the 
requirement that such plans contain “standards, plans and 
programs for providing adequate housing opportunities to meet 
existing and projected local and regional housing needs.”151  Just as 
the Mount Laurel Doctrine enjoins local cooperation in regional 
housing distribution, LUPA requires municipalities within the 
seven-county area to shoulder their fair share of present and future 
regional need.  In step with the realism expressed in Mount Laurel 
II, LUPA provides a meaningful compliance mechanism:  
suspension of local development unless and until the 
comprehensive plan is modified to reflect regional targets for 
matters of metropolitan significance.152 
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the Council’s right to 
effectively suspend local development under Minnesota Statute § 
473.175 in City of Lake Elmo v. Metropolitan Council.153  In order to 
 
 148. S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II), 456 A.2d 390, 
433 (N.J. 1983). 
 149. Orfield, supra note 5, at 919–920; see also Edward G. Goetz, Karen Chapple 
& Barbara Lukermann, The Rise and Fall of Fair Share Housing: Lessons from the 
Twin Cities, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND HOUSING CHOICE IN 
METROPOLITAN AMERICA 251 (Xavier de Souza Briggs ed., 2005). 
 150. § 473.859, subd. 1. 
 151. Id. at subd. 2 (emphasis added). 
 152. MINN. STAT. §§ 473.173, 473.851, 473.859, subd. 2(c) (2017). 
 153. 685 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2004). 
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predict and manage population growth, the Council mandated that 
Lake Elmo, a rural town within its jurisdiction, accommodate a 
minimum of three housing units per acre by 2040, in accordance 
with the Council’s Regional Blueprint.154  Lake Elmo resisted this 
density requirement, arguing that such a mandate would threaten 
the “essential character of [its] community” and that the Council 
had not been granted explicit statutory authority to compel local 
density minimums.155  The court disagreed, reasoning that the 
Council’s supervision of “orderly and economical development, 
public and private, of the metropolitan area,” in conjunction with 
Minnesota Statute § 473.175, grants the Council authority to reign 
in any local comprehensive plan that substantially departs from the 
Council’s system plans.156 
The broader implication of City of Lake Elmo is that the 
Council’s blueprint for development takes primacy in any number 
of strategic areas, named or otherwise, and can enjoin local 
governments to shoulder their fair share of regional burdens.157  
More specifically, the Council can publish density requirements and 
effectively suspend local development until housing is adequately 
provided for.158  As demonstrated in City of Lake Elmo, the Council’s 
enforcement arm is not limited to those growth sectors identified in 
LUPA, but rather applies to any local initiative deemed 
incompatible with regional development.159  This language is, and 
has been, sufficient to force developing municipalities in the Twin 
Cities to shoulder their fair share of affordable housing. 
During the First Wave of housing policy under LUPA,160 
spanning from 1971 to 1982, the Council used this comprehensive 
review power to increase low- and moderate-income housing across 
the region.161  In the first three years of this period, the Council 
 
 154. Id. at 6. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. MINN. STAT. § 473.175 subd. 3 (2017).  This power of persuasion can be, and 
has been, used to ensure affordable housing throughout the seven-county area.  See 
Orfield, supra note 5, at 920–923 (describing the Council’s use of its authority to 
encourage subsidized housing development in the suburbs and the inner city). 
 158. § 473.175 subd. 3. 
 159. City of Lake Elmo, 685 N.W.2d at 6. 
 160. See Edward G. Goetz, Karen Chapple & Barbara Lukermann, The Minnesota 
Land Use Planning Act and the Promotion of Low- and Moderate-Income Housing in 
Suburbia, 22 LAW & INEQ. 31, 43 (2004) (describing the three “waves” of Council 
policy, each delineating a distinct strategy to addressing the Poverty Housing 
Industry). 
 161. Trudy McFall, A Regional Housing Strategy: From Plans to Implementation 
11 (1975) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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drafted two Allocation Plans indicating where and to what extent 
the region could grow its affordable housing stock.162  In doing so, 
the Council examined the capacity of each of the Twin Cities’ nine 
subsectors, looking primarily for communities that were “well-
serviced and with good proximity to metropolitan services and 
facilities.”163  For this reason, the prioritization scheme largely 
mirrored the so-called rings of suburban development, with each 
successive community away from the urban core more capitalized 
than the one before it.  Then Council Regional Director Trudy 
McFall affirmed this relationship, stating that the inner-ring, 
developing suburbs with “less proximity to employment, shopping 
and service concentrations, receive lower priority,” while 
established suburban communities along the outer ring were prime 
candidates for affordable housing.164 
These Allocation Plans, which codified the Council’s regional 
housing strategy, provided clear direction for local governments in 
preparing their own comprehensive plans.165  As discussed above, 
these comprehensive plans must reference sufficient existing and 
new housing to meet the local unit’s share of the metropolitan area 
need for low- and moderate-income housing, and the Council may 
suspend local development that “substantially departs” from the 
regional scheme.166  In reviewing this requirement under Minnesota 
Statute § 473.851, the Council had two critical housing 
considerations in mind.167  First, the Council consulted the 
community’s quantifiable goals for affordable housing and 
determined whether these plans comported with the Council’s 
targets for the corresponding priority ring.168  Second, the Council 
looked for a concrete plan to reduce the cost of market-rate housing, 
a prerogative required of all communities, regardless of priority 
ring.169  First Wave comprehensive plans often satisfied these 
considerations by referencing the Council’s allocation plan, as local 
governments could easily discern what the Council was looking for, 
 
 162. Id.; Orfield, supra note 5, at 920–921. 
 163. McFall, supra note 161, at 11.  This reflected the Council’s commitment to 
placing low- and moderate-income units in communities that could support new 
growth. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See, e.g., Goetz, Chapple & Lukermann, supra note 160, at 48 (explaining 
how the Council’s regional plan shaped future local planning in regard to low-income 
housing). 
 166. MINN. STAT. §§ 473.851, 473.859, subd. 2(c) (2017). 
 167. See McFall, supra note 161, at 17–18. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 18. 
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in terms of regional housing development.170  Using LUPA, the early 
Council could and, in fact, did suspend comprehensive plans that 
departed from the First and Second Allocation Plans.171  Given the 
historical deference shown to the Council in determining 
compatibility, this suspension power represents a unique 
affirmative governmental device, of the sort contemplated by Mount 
Laurel I. 
ii. State Grant Oversight 
LUPA accords an additional affirmative device to the Council 
under Minnesota Statute § 473.171. 172  As discussed in Part I, the 
Council may review all applications for state grants and loans 
“submitted in connection with proposed matters of metropolitan 
significance.”173  This statutory device is considerably stronger than 
that under the comprehensive plan review; indeed, as the overseer 
of all state grants, the Council has leverage to induce local 
compliance. 
From 1976 to 1982, the Council drew upon LUPA to create 
Policy 13/39,174 which governed the disbursement of federal and 
state funds to local governments in the seven-county area.  In 
reviewing applications for state or federal grants, “priority for such 
requests would be given based on the community’s housing 
performance.”175  Under Policy 39, the Council was empowered to 
examine not only the merits of an application itself, but the 
applicant’s “plans and programs to provide such housing 
opportunities [for low- and moderate-income persons] in the 
future.”176  This second component provided a strong incentive 
structure:  without opening their land to low- and middle-income 
units, local communities could not secure outside funding for vital 
infrastructure, such as sewers, parks, and highways.177 
In determining housing performance, the Council examined a 
variety of measures, among them the amount of low- and moderate-
 
 170. See Goetz, Chapple & Lukermann, supra note 160, at 48. 
 171. See McFall, supra note 161, at 17 (describing the leverage of the Council in 
compelling compliance with the regional plan). 
 172. MINN. STAT. § 473.171 (2017). 
 173. Id. at subd. 1. 
 174. As Professor Myron Orfield of the Institute for Metropolitan Opportunity 
explained, the policy described here was initially named Policy 13 but was later 
renumbered Policy 39.  Letter to Starling, supra note 95, at 23.  This Article will 
hereinafter refer to the policy as “Policy 39.” 
 175. See McFall, supra note 161, at 8. 
 176. Metro Council, supra note 4, at 45. 
 177. McFall, supra note 161, at 8. 
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cost market-rate housing in the existing housing supply, the 
amount of subsidized housing in the community, and plans for 
future affordable housing sites.178  After the assessment, a local 
community was given a composite score and ranked alongside all 
other constituent communities, and this public index was consulted 
in funding decisions.179  Once published, this index provided 
transparent feedback to local governments, which were encouraged 
to compete amongst each other in neighborhood integration.180  This 
public index also served expressive functions; over time, it 
demonstrated the Council’s commitment to affordable housing, a 
message that communities took seriously.181 
While the Council has discontinued Policy 39, the power to 
review applications for state grants and loans remains firmly 
embedded within LUPA.182  Quizzically, the Council argues to the 
contrary, claiming that this review process was solely authorized by 
the now-repealed OMB Circular A-95 review power183 over federal 
grants.184  This assertion, however, is misguided.  A-95 review 
pertained only to the Council’s review of federal funds and, though 
funds are no longer within the purview of the Council, had no 
impact upon the Council’s review of state grants and loans, as 
codified by a wholly distinct provision in LUPA.185  This issue 
remains to be litigated, but its resolution in favor of the 
complainants would lend credence to the idea that the powers to 
withhold state funding from local entities until they become “fair-
share” compliant remain in force. 
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Conclusion 
The Council has been granted extraordinary authority over 
the spatial and demographic development of the Twin Cities.  This 
Article has attempted to nest LUPA within the prevailing trends in 
regional governance at the time of LUPA’s passage.  The uniquely 
interdependent nature of the Twin Cities, as established in 
Onischuk,186 signaled to LUPA visionaries, like Robert Freilich, the 
need for a robust burden-sharing framework, one that can divert 
resources like housing to the region’s most vulnerable residents as 
needed.  Such an interpretation is supported by the statutory 
language that emerged and the pattern of Council behavior that 
followed from 1976 to 1982. 
The departure from early affordable housing strategy has 
revealed, unsurprisingly, that the free hand of the housing market 
has always led to the same place:  a tale of two cities (or three, or 
four).  Without an affirmative Council, local governments have 
proven incapable of ensuring equitable development.  In order to 
open the doors of opportunity and access to the Twin Cities’ most 
prosperous neighborhoods, the Council must once again harness its 
full statutory authority as a regional land-use planning body. 
 
 186. Burnsville v. Onischuk, 222 N.W.2d 523, 532–33 (Minn. 1974). 
